

# SCIENCE & GOVERNMENT REPORT

The Independent Bulletin of Science Policy

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September 1, 1976

## Carter and Ford: Awash with Science Advisers

While the Ford Administration is setting up a White House science advisory staff that has an actuarial expectancy of 25 weeks, the Carter camp has been establishing its links with leaders of the national scientific enterprise. Both operations, it should be recognized, rank relatively low in Washington affairs these days, but they are likely to have some longterm effects on government's care, feeding, and application of science and technology in coming years.

First, let's catch up with what's been happening at the White House.

The bungled birth of the Office of Science and Technology Policy finally took place on August 12, when the oath of office for the OSTP directorship was admin-

### *Science Court Moves Closer to Tryout—Page 8*

istered by Vice President Rockefeller to H. Guyford Stever, director of the National Science Foundation and part-time presidential science adviser for the past 3½ years.

Stever, who didn't want the job — one reason being that he felt it was too close to the end of the presidential term to accomplish very much — promptly left Washington for 10 days of fishing in New Hampshire. In any case, his term will be a short one, since, as the Administration's last-resort candidate, he took the job with the understanding that he won't stay on past inauguration day (SGR Vol. VI, No. 13).

Nevertheless, groundwork for OSTP is going ahead as though forever is in the cards. The legislation that created the office provided for the establishment of an 8-14-member President's Committee on Science and Technology to conduct a 2-year study of national science policy and organization. At Stever's recommendation, the President has appointed Simon Ramo, co-founder of TRW, Inc., to chair the committee. Ramo comes to the task with sterling qualifications, having long served in the Washington advisory network; his latest chore was as chairman of one of the 2 advisory groups that Mr. Ford established last year to do preparatory work for OSTP. However, Ramo's Republican affiliation may be a bit of a problem if Carter inherits the 2-year study (See p. 2).

While Stever was fishing, staffing of OSTP was going ahead. With offices in the Executive Office

Building, next door to the White House, and the Executive Office Building Annex, around the corner, OSTP is drawing its staff mainly from aides that Stever hired to assist him in his former role as NSF director and part-time presidential science adviser.

Among them are his personal assistant, Phil Smith, who will have the same role in OSTP; Russell Drew, who headed the Science and Technology Policy Office, set up by Stever at NSF to support his advisory function; Stanley Schneider, who served as an assistant to Stever after long service to Glenn Seaborg when he was chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, and William Montgomery, who comes from NSF's directorate for science-policy activities to serve as executive officer for OSTP.

Stever also plans to take on 3 or 4 "senior consultants," who will serve on a half-time basis, an arrangement that probably arises from the difficulty of getting people to cut loose completely from their present

*(Continued on Page 2)*

## In Print

The politically sensitive issue of a pay boost for top government health officials has cleared one hurdle, with approval for a raise to \$52,000 a year by the House subcommittee on Commerce, Health, and Environment. The move was inspired by a resignation threat from Frank Rauscher, director of the National Cancer Institute, who termed his \$37,800 salary inadequate (SGR Vol. VI, No. 11). The Senate is yet to stir on the issue.

*General Foods Corp. is about to launch a nationwide advertising counterattack in behalf of food additives. One full-page magazine ad is headed: "Dear General Foods, People are what they eat. So why should I eat propylene glycol monostearate?" Answer: Without it, "Frozen desserts wouldn't hold together very well . . . Breads wouldn't have their fineness of grain. . ."*

Meanwhile, Rep. Ben Rosenthal (D-NY) and Michael Jacobson of the Center for Science in the Public Interest (CSPI), have issued a 26-page paper, "Feeding at the Company Trough," detailing the financial links between university-based nutrition specialists and major food firms. Copies available for 50 cents from CSPI, 1757 S St. NW., Washington, DC 20009.

## **Carter Would Inherit Nixon-Backer Ramo at Helm of 2-Year Study**

An odd scenario is shaping up in connection with Simon Ramo's appointment to chair the President's Committee on Science and Technology, which is to carry out a 2-year review of the federal role in research and development.

It may reasonably be assumed that Ford and company will be sent packing next January; but if and when they depart, the 2-year study will just be getting underway. And at its helm will be Chairman Ramo, whose Republicanism is so well-rooted that in October 1972, the notorious Committee for the Re-Election of the President (Nixon) announced formation of a Science and Engineering Council in Support of the President, with Simon Ramo sharing the chairmanship. Co-chairing with Ramo was the elder statesmen of Republican scientific affairs, William O. Baker, president of Bell Labs.

Though closely tied to the Nixon re-election apparatus, the Council sought to pass itself off as a politically neutral body that planned to survive the election season and provide scientific wisdom for the Administration. Nothing more was heard from it before or after election day; when Ramo, who was once a candidate for the job Stever now holds, was asked about it last year, he said he regarded the Council as non-partisan and was unaware of any connection with Nixon's re-election campaign.

As for his widely reported candidacy for the directorship of OSTP, Ramo never acknowledged interest in the job, but for a while he moved around

Washington as though he anticipated a summons, and on one occasion, even called the science press corps to a well-stocked hotel suite, where he mysteriously expatiated on national science policy; he then concluded the session by asserting that he had called the meeting to discuss TRW affairs.

His candidacy, however, disappeared from speculation when aides to Senator Kennedy indicated that, as a condition of his confirmation, Ramo would have to place a serious barrier between himself and his TRW holdings. Since the financial effects of such a move would not be inconsequential, Ramo apparently decided that it wasn't worth it for 6 or so months of serving as Mr. Ford's science adviser, and the honor passed, by default, to Guy Stever.

Since the Committee that Ramo heads holds a 2-year charter by Act of Congress, there is no reason for him to go through the motions of a *pro forma* resignation if Carter is elected; and there is even reason to doubt that Carter could legally change the chairmanship. But legalities and realities do diverge in such matters, and there should be no doubt that if Carter wants to change the chairmanship, Ramo will leave. For Carter, however, there would be a price to pay: He'll be charged with politically interfering with the pure ways of science — a charge that Richard Nixon incurred when, in 1969, he vetoed Franklin Long for the directorship of NSF upon learning that Long was opposed to the anti-ballistic missile.

### **Science Advice (Continued From Page 1)**

jobs in the waning days of the presidential term.

In addition, as specified by the OSTP legislation, Stever is supposed to reshape the Federal Council for Science and Technology into a more effective coordinating body for government research activities, and he is also supposed to set up an organization to coordinate federal-state research-related activities.

With all that going on, he is also to serve as a member of the Domestic Council and as an adviser to the National Security Council.

### **Carter's Science Task Force**

Meanwhile, the Democratic campaign has entrusted science to a Science Policy Task Force, but in contrast to similarly named bodies in past presidential campaigns, the Task Force appears to be an open-to-the public suggestion-box system, rather than a traditional policy advisory group. In fact, Harry Schwartz,

the Washington coordinator for an assortment of Carter task forces, told SGR that "task force is an unfortunate choice of words. They're not really task forces, in the usual sense."

Whatever they are, the Science Policy Task Force has as its "coordinator" Lewis Branscomb, Chief Scientist and a vice president of IBM, who was director of the National Bureau of Standards from 1969 to 1973. (A measure of the denatured politics of science policy affairs is to be seen in the fact that Branscomb was appointed last year by the Ford Administration to serve on one of the advisory committees that did spadework for OSTP).

Branscomb told SGR that he became acquainted with Carter in New York last December when his daughter was a candidate for delegate to the Democratic National Convention. (She lost, but was appointed a delegate at large).

Carter, he said, later asked him to head the science task force — a natural selection, since Branscomb has

(Continued on Page 3)

**Science Advice** (Continued From Page 2)

long been involved in Washington science advisory affairs.

Branscomb explained, and Carter's staff people repeatedly emphasized, that the task forces rarely, if ever, meet; they don't prepare the usual "position papers," and their job is not to work out policies for the candidate.

Rather, as Branscomb put it, the assignment of the members is to "help with analysis and identification of specific issues." Members send their ideas to Washington campaign headquarters, which then passes them along to Atlanta, where, as Branscomb put it, "The work product will show up in the campaign strategy."

Branscomb even declined to name his fellow task-force members, saying that it was up to campaign headquarters to identify them. Campaign headquarters said it would name "only a few, so that you'll get the idea of the kinds of people we're working with." But it finally parted with a partially deleted list (see box) when

SGR made reference to Carter's pledge of an open campaign. The deletions were justified on the grounds that some task force members are shy about being publicly associated with the campaign.

Since the Republican Campaign Committee has no counterpart of the Carter task force — and apparently none is planned — no comparison is possible; but then none is really necessary, since there has never been more than a slight divergence between the parties' stated positions on science and technology.

Thus, the Republican Party Platform states, under the heading of Science and Technology, "Every aspect of our domestic economy and well-being, our international competitive position, and national security is related to our past and present leadership in basic and applied research and the development of our technology. But there can be no complacency about our continued commitment to maintain this leadership position."

The statement could easily have been lifted from any  
(Continued on Page 4)

### **Democratic Candidate Lists Members of Science Task Force**

*Jimmy Carter's Washington campaign headquarters lists the following as members of the candidate's Science Policy Task Force, with the notation that some members' names have been withheld at their request and that others are likely to be added:*

Lewis Branscomb, Chief Scientist, IBM, coordinator

Harold Brown, president, Caltech

Ivan Bennett Jr., president, NYU Medical Center

Arthur Purcell, Washington, DC

Harvey Brooks, retired, dean of engineering and applied physics, Harvard

George Sponsler, president, International Planning and Management Corp., Bethesda, Md.

Cecile Barker, president, OAO Corp., Beltsville, Md.

Dorothy Zinberg, Program for Science and International Affairs, Harvard

Helen Whiteley, professor of microbiology, University of Washington

Ray Bowers, Department of Science, Technology, and Society, Cornell

Melvin Kranzberg, Georgia Institute of Technology

Gilbert White, University of Colorado

David Baltimore, MIT

Leo Goldberg, Aura, Inc., Tucson, Arizona

Michael Michaelis, Arthur D. Little, Inc., Washington, DC

George Pake, director of research, Xerox Corp., Palo Alto, California

William Bevan, Department of Psychology, Duke University

Walter Munk, Scripps Institute of Oceanography, LaJolla, California

Stephen Schneider, National Center for Atmospheric Research, Boulder, Colorado

George Low, president, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Troy, NY

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## White House Advisory Groups List 8 Urgent R&D Issues

The 2 advisory groups that were established last year to prepare an agenda for the Office of Science and Technology Policy (SGR Vol. V, No. 22) have now been dissolved, and have left behind a list of 65 policy issues from which 8 have been culled as being particularly urgent.

Chaired by William O. Baker president of Bell Laboratories, and Simon Ramo, of TRW, Inc., the committees consisted of about 32 members, drawn from industry, government and academe.

The issues selected for top attention are:

- Food, with emphasis on losses that occur in trans-

portation, storage, and processing.

- Nutrition research, the adequacy of federal efforts in this field, and the question of whether the federal food stamp program is nutritionally sound.

- Government regulation and its effects on the innovative process in high-technology industries.

- Energy, including research, conservation, and the tradeoff between environmental protection and costs.

- Oceans, with emphasis on whether federal coordination of research is at a sufficiently high level to be effective; also, the adequacy of research aimed at economic exploitation.

- Industrial productivity, including whether new technology is being effectively employed to raise output.

- Basic research, the role of OSTP in assessing its support, and the linkage of such research to mission-oriented agencies.

- OSTP and its role in the federal policymaking process.

### Science Advice (Continued From Page 3)

recent Democratic Platform, except for the current one, which makes only passing references to science and technology.

Where the parties do separate slightly is in their choice of recruiting grounds, with the Democrats tending to look more to academe and the Republicans to high-technology industry. But there is ample overlap in the professional origins of their choices. Furthermore, both tend to the middle of the community. The Republicans never appointed Edward Teller to high science office; the Democrats have not showered any honors on Barry Commoner.

The main point of difference between the 2 parties when it comes to science-related matters is mainly in the field of arms control. It isn't really a science-policy matter, but the subject was long ago embraced by the eastern wing of the scientific leadership and it remains a dear one. The Democratic advisers regard themselves as a useful counterweight to the Pentagon's go-for-broke weapons planning. Republican advisers, at least since George Kistiakowsky, who served under Eisenhower, have either been indifferent to the subject or were under orders to leave it alone.

What is notable about the Carter task force list is that it contains a number of longtime advisers who largely dropped out of the Washington scene when Nixon came in. Their motives may be wholly uncontaminated by personal ambition, but the odd nature of the Carter "task forces" does invite exploitation of the widespread desire to get in on the ground floor of what is likely to be the new administration. Apparently it doesn't take much to earn the label of a Carter science adviser, at least at this stage of the campaign. Unlike Legionnaire's Disease, Potomac Fever is a well-understood malady, though cure rates for both are extremely low.—DSG

## R&D Spending Rises 8 Per Cent

Public and private spending on research and development in the US is keeping just ahead of inflation, but the combined total for 1976 is down slightly as a percentage of gross national product, according to the National Science Foundation.

The total for 1976 is forecast at \$38.1 billion, an 8 per cent increase over 1975, but only a 2 per cent increase in purchasing power after inflation is allowed for. As a percentage of GNP, the figure is 2.2 per cent, down .1 from 1975.

Spending for basic research rose 7 per cent from 1975; applied research grew by 8 per cent, and developmental activities rose 9 per cent.

Federal funds account for \$20.1 billion of the 1976 forecast while industrial spending is expected to amount to \$16.6 billion. Both figures are up by 8 per cent since 1975. The balance of the national R&D total comes from universities and other non-profit institutions.

Employment of scientists and engineers totaled 530,000 in 1975, up 1 per cent from the previous year. Two-thirds worked for industry, and 16 per cent were employed in universities and associated federal research centers. Twelve per cent worked for the federal government.

These data are from NSF Report 76-310, available for 95 cents from the US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402. Request stock number 038-000-00285-6.



## UK Nuclear Authority Reopens Issue of Reactor Choice

LONDON

The strange saga of Britain's nuclear reactor policy took another twist recently when the Board members of the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA) unanimously questioned a policy some of them had helped formulate just two years earlier.

In reopening the issue they have brought into doubt the future of the Steam Generating Heavy Water Reactor (SGHWR) and reopened the door, only slightly so far, to the American Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR). This rethink comes just two years after a long and messy review led the government to choose the SGHWR as the basis for future thermal reactor orders in Britain. This policy was backed with a decision to

### European Report

order 4000 MW of SGHWRs — there were to be six reactors each of 660MW — with a hope that there would be more orders once the program got under way.

Sir John Hill, chairman of the UKAEA and the government's chief adviser on nuclear policy, reopened what most people considered a closed book when he told Energy Secretary Tony Benn that with one exception — the South of Scotland Electricity Board (SSEB) — there is a widespread feeling in the nuclear business in favor of ditching the SGHWR for PWRs or a new version of Britain's Advanced Gas-Cooled Reactor (AGR).

Rumors of trouble with the SGHWR began to circulate as delays held up completion of the "reference design" of the reactor. The Nuclear Power Company (NPC), formed out of the two existing reactor construction consortia, was finding it harder than anticipated to turn the design of the 100-MW prototype SGHWR, which has been operating at Winfrith in Dorset since 1968, into a commercial reactor. Not least of the problems was that of bringing the reactor up to modern safety standards.

There was never an official statement on the SGHWR's problems. Indeed, nothing of the current events was made public until Tony Benn told the House of Commons that the Board of the UKAEA, which consists of people from all sides of the nuclear establishment — with the exception of the South of Scotland Electricity Board which was, however, invited to attend the Board's meetings — had reviewed the reactor program, and that Sir John Hill had sent him a report summarizing the Board's discussions and conclusions.

Any government minister other than Benn might have left it there, revealing nothing until the government had made up its mind on what to do. But Benn makes much of "open government" — a rare commodity in Britain

— and earlier in the summer he held a 1-day public meeting to debate the country's energy policy when rumors were running thick and fast as to the possible demise of the SGHWR. When the House of Commons Select Committee on Science and Technology — a committee of Members of Parliament that has frequently pursued the reactor policy issue — decided to review the SGHWR program, it invited Benn to be its first witness.

Benn's next unusual step was to release to the MPs copies of the report from Sir John Hill and the dissenting report from the SSEB. At the Select Committee's unusually crowded public hearing, Benn and the MPs vied with each other to see who could reveal more of the documents' contents. Another unexpected move came in the following week when Benn published the reports.

Benn told the MPs that he had not asked Sir John Hill to instigate a review of reactor policy; indeed he made it clear that he would have preferred not to have the policy challenged. He also told the MPs that as the SGHWR was designed and built by the UKAEA, the Authority was, by questioning its own technology, raising doubts about its competence. And this might, Benn threatened, call into question the UKAEA's other systems. (This was taken as a threat to the fast-reactor program, which is also at a crucial stage, with a decision due soon on the next phase of the program.) However, Hill's report to Benn said that changes since the 1974 decision make it "right and proper that we should look at the changes factually and dispassionately so that we can consider whether our present nuclear policy still remains our best choice."

The UKAEA Board concluded that "the SGHWR program looks less attractive than it seemed 2 years ago and, on balance, there is a consensus opinion [noting that SSEB dissent] that the program should be replaced by AGRs or PWRs."

Several factors have changed the picture over the past

*(Continued on Page 6)*

### OTA Publication List

A catalog listing 33 publications issued by the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment since its inception is available without charge from OTA, 119 D St. NE., Washington, DC 20510. The publications may be ordered from the US Government Printing Office, the National Technical Information Service, or the Congressional committees for which studies were conducted.

## ...Rising Costs, Concern for Safety Inspire New Review

(Continued From Page 5)

2 years. Electricity demand is growing much more slowly than previously; thus there is no justification for ordering any new generating capacity, let alone 4000 MW of SGHWRs for completion in the early 1980s. Therefore the program would have to be stretched out over a longer period, with fewer reactors built.

Hill's report spells out the case against the SGHWR. "Modifications in the interest of higher safety standards have had to be made and have inevitably added to the cost. The first 660-MW SGHWR would moreover be more of a demonstration reactor than we thought it was 2 years ago. The combination of additional requirements and the much smaller and stretched out program would probably result in the unit costs of the early stations becoming unacceptably high." Indeed, the NPC believes that the SGHWR would be substantially more expensive than other water-cooled reactors built to the same standards.

The SSEB's report attacks the SGHWR reference design as being "unnecessarily costly, partly as a result of invoking safety and release criteria more severe than are applied to PWRs, but partly because of repeated applications of additional design margins at all stages of the design."

The alternatives to the SGHWR are the AGR and the PWR. The AGR is a development of Britain's gas-cooled Magnox reactors. Five twin-reactor AGR power stations are under construction — 2 are nearing commercial operation — but when the SGHWR was chosen the AGR program, which consists of 5 different designs, was in difficulty, with fears in some quarters that the AGRs might never work satisfactorily. AGRs are once again an option, although "the AGR design would have to be modified to take account of the lessons learned during the construction and early operation of the first stations," according to Hill's report. But these changes should prove less costly than launching a new reactor.

The PWR is the other option for the UK's thermal reactor program. Sir John Hill says that if the safety review now being conducted by the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (NII) — Britain's reactor licensing authority — proves satisfactory, "there is a strong argument that our future needs for thermal reactors should be met by construction of PWRs built under license." This is the policy advocated years ago by the Central Electricity Generating Board (Britain's largest electricity generating utility, covering England and Wales) and the General Electric Company (nothing to do with GE), which at the time was the major shareholder in the National Nuclear Corporation. The

### *Hang on, Policymakers, Help is on the Way*

*The following excerpt, concerning an NSF-supported research project, is from an announcement by the Science Communication Division, Department of Medical and Public Affairs, of the George Washington University Medical Center:*

The objective of this project is to develop systematically a hierarchy of issues, according to the criteria, priorities, and Federal Government policymaking options within the context of public and private interaction in the mutual area of scientific and technical information activities. The sub-objectives are to: 1) Determine specifically those key public policy issues related to public/private interaction with respect to scientific and technical information activities; 2) Investigate and explicate the relationships among key issues, root causes, significance and hierarchy of policy issues requiring Federal policymaking; 3) Determine the policymaking options for each issue; and, 4) Recommend appropriate operational experiments to test underlying policymaking options to provide a basis for recommending a given policy set . . .

It is anticipated that a knowledge of the hierarchy of issues and their relationships, priorities among issues and policymaking options in each defined issue area of the public/private interface in scientific and technical information systems will assist policymakers in meeting the demands posed by the environment and legislation.

UKAEA opposed the PWR 2 years ago.

When it was first suggested that PWRs might be built in the UK, Sir Alan Cottrell, a metallurgist and at one time the chief scientific adviser to the British government, questioned the safety of their pressure vessels. In the past 2 years a UKAEA study group under the chairmanship of Walter Marshall, chief scientist at the Department of Energy and deputy chairman of the UKAEA, has carried out a detailed investigation of the integrity of PWR pressure vessels, using information supplied by government agencies and industry in the US. Hill says, that "as a result we are now confident that we can provide answers to the questions raised by Sir Alan Cottrell, which we were

(Continued on Page 7)

**Nuclear** (Continued From Page 6)

unable to answer satisfactorily at that time. The pressure vessel report has been seen by Sir Alan Cottrell, who has accepted its main conclusions."

The SSEB sees the safety of PWRs, and Cottrell's opinion, in a different light. It says that the Marshall report "is extremely thorough and enables us to better understand the fabrication and operational problems of these vessels. The report confirms the views expressed 2 years ago that to have a safe vessel it is essential to fabricate it well-nigh perfectly, from well-nigh perfect materials, and carry out well-nigh perfect inspection throughout its life . . . In our view the report provides no grounds for believing that these vessels are safer than was believed to be the case a few years ago." The SSEB's understanding is that "Sir Alan shares these views."

With Cottrell vacationing when Benn released the 2 reports, he was not available to clarify this confusion. However, this is less important than the NII survey of PWR safety, which is due to be completed next March.

Hill said "We are now of the opinion that it is possible for the Nuclear Inspector to be satisfied about the safety of pressure vessels for PWRs in this country." But there can be no decision by the government before the NII reports its findings.

A clean bill of health for the PWR would not be the green light for PWR ordering in the UK. The SGHWR has won inexplicable support from the trade unions. Benn is on the left of the Labor party and is reluctant to do anything that might provoke the displeasure of the unions. This and Britain's nuclear nationalism must make the PWR's chances slim.

It is a paradox that the problems facing Britain's nuclear reactor industry stem partly from the country's wealth of energy resources. Without North Sea oil and gas, and large coal deposits, the UK would not be worrying about the industry's survival over the next decade or so, but about its ability to build enough reactors. However, the small home demand will release the country's formidable nuclear fuel cycle capacity for export business. British Nuclear Fuels Limited (BNFL) operates a successful reprocessing facility; it is a partner in the Urenco consortium that is building gas centrifuge uranium enrichments plants; and it is now expanding its high-level waste solidification effort. Thus while the US has reactor makers but poor fuel-cycle facilities, the UK is in the opposite position.—MK

### **NSF Basic Science Budget Rose Sharply under Stever**

When Guy Stever became director of the National Science Foundation, in February 1972, he said that one of his main objectives would be to enlarge NSF's role as a supporter of basic research.

It is difficult to sort out basic research from NSF's innumerable programs, but if figures supplied by the Foundation at SGR's request are accurate — and there is no reason to believe they are not — Stever succeeded quite well.

To get some perspective, let's first look at the 3 fiscal years that preceded his first real impact on the budget:

Total NSF obligations (in millions)	Basic research portion (in millions)
1971 \$496	\$273
1972 601	368
1973 610	392

Because federal budgets are formulated long in advance, the first Stever budget came in the following fiscal year. The figures are as follows:

1974 646	415
1975 693	490
1976 731 (Estimate)	523
1977 783 (Estimate)	600

*Starting with this issue, Michael Kenward, news editor of the British journal New Scientist, will write monthly for SGR on European science-policy affairs.*

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## Science Court to be Reviewed at 3-Day Meeting

The Science Court proposal — first raised over a decade ago and under serious consideration since early this year (SGR Vol. VI, No. 3) — is progressing, but slowly.

Originally formulated by Arthur Kantrowitz, founder and chairman of the Avco Everett Research Laboratory, the court proposal was embraced by one of the task forces that President Ford established last year to do preparatory work for the new White House science office.

It was later put under the wing of a special high-level task force. The next step will come September 19, when a 3-day colloquium will be held at the Xerox International Center, Leesburg, Va., to discuss various aspects of the proposal, including "experiments" that might be conducted to test its workings.

Co-chaired by Kantrowitz and Betsy Ancker-Johnson, assistant secretary of Commerce for science and technology, the colloquium will include, among a large cast, several adversaries on current issues of science and public policy; their task will be to discuss procedures that might be suitable for the court. Thus, Nobel laureate Hans Bethe, a backer of nuclear power, will debate with nuclear critic John Holdren, of the University of California, Berkeley; James Turner, a Washington attorney who has questioned the safety of food additives, will be matched with Howard Bauman, vice president for science and technology of the Pillsbury Co.

Other participants include Richard O. Simpson, former chairman of the Consumer Product Safety Commission; Philip Abelson, editor of *Science*; Russell E. Train, head of the Environmental Protection Agency; Donald B. Straus, president of the Research Institute of the American Arbitration Association.

Also, H. Guyford Stever, science adviser to the President; Frederic Seitz, president of Rockefeller University; John Noble Wilford, *New York Times*; Robert Cowan, *Christian Science Monitor*, and Philip M. Boffey, *Science*.

Kantrowitz told SGR that EPA's Train has proposed examination of several issues, among them the problems of extrapolating carcinogenic data from animals to man and the effect of CO<sub>2</sub> and particulate matter on climate.

The National Science Foundation, according to Kantrowitz, has indicated that it will provide financial support for an experimental tryout of the court. Still to be worked out, he said, is an "institutional host" to administer the grant and provide backup services.

The Leesburg meeting is being financed by a \$5000 grant from Xerox, plus a board and lodging charge of \$95 per head for spectators, of whom about 250 can be accommodated.

Additional information is available from the office of Betsy Ancker-Johnson, assistant secretary for science and technology, US Department of Commerce, Washington, DC 20230. Telephone: (202) 377-3113.

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